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The Incentives for North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods

机译：减轻污染商品贸易的缓解气候变化技术南北转移的激励措施

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摘要

The need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations. Little progress has however been made, as shown by Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. One reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets. This paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions, the North and the South, and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market, to analyze the North's incentives to accept technology transfer. Results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation. When both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non-cooperatively, inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the North to accept the transfer. In contrast, when governments set quotas cooperatively, the North has no incentive to share its technology either before or after the agreement. Technology transfer commitments may be included in the agreement, but with no effect on global emissions and global surplus. The only impacts are distributional, technology transfers and side payments may be substitute instruments.
机译：自气候谈判开始以来，就已经认识到有必要将减缓气候变化技术转让给发展中国家。但是，如《巴黎协定》第10条所示，进展甚微。原因之一是这些技术可能成为在全球市场上竞争的重要资产。本文提出了一个具有北方和南方两个区域且国际污染商品市场竞争不完善的局部均衡模型，以分析北方接受技术转让的动机。结果关键取决于环境合作的存在。当北方和南方政府非合作地设定排放配额时，要减少全球排放量是北方接受转让的必要条件，但不是充分条件。相反，当政府合作设定配额时，北方在达成协议之前或之后都没有动力共享其技术。技术转让承诺可以包含在协议中，但不会影响全球排放量和全球盈余。唯一的影响是分配，技术转让和附带付款可能是替代工具。

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  • 来源
    《Environmental & Resource Economics》 |2017年第3期|435-456|共22页
  • 作者

    Glachant Matthieu; Ing Julie; Nicolai Jean Philippe;

  • 作者单位

    PSL Res Univ, MINES ParisTech, CERNA Ctr Ind Econ, UMR CNRS i3, Paris, France;

    Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Ctr Econ Res, CER ETH, Zurichbergstr 18, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland;

    Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Chair Integrat Risk Management & Econ, Zurichbergstr 18, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland;

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