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The Silence of the Lambs: Payment for Carnivore Conservation and Livestock Farming Under Strategic Behavior

机译：沉默的羔羊：战略行为下的肉食动物保护和畜牧业支付

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During the last few decades, the number of large carnivores (wolf, bear, lynx and wolverines) has increased significantly in Scandinavia. As a result of more predation of livestock, conflicts with livestock farmers have deepened. We model this conflict using sheep farming as an example, and in instances in which farmers are given compensation for the predation loss. The compensation scheme is composed of a fixed per animal loss value (ex-post), but also a compensation just for the presence of the carnivores (ex-ante). Ex-post compensation payment is practiced in many countries where farmers are affected by killed and injured livestock, but also damages to crops. Ex-ante payment implies payment for environmental services and is also widely practiced. In the first part of the paper, the stocking decision of a group of farmers is analyzed. In a next step, the Directorate for Natural Resource Management (DNRM), managing the carnivores and compensation scheme, is introduced. The strategic interaction between the sheep farmers and DNRM is modelled as a Stackelberg game with DNRM as the leader. We find that it is not beneficial for DNRM to use ex-post, but only ex-ante compensation. The solution to the game is compared to the social planner solution, and numerical illustrations indicate that the efficiency loss of the ex-ante compensation scheme to be small.
机译：在过去的几十年中，斯堪的那维亚的大型食肉动物（狼，熊，山猫和金刚狼）的数量显着增加。由于更多地捕食牲畜，与牲畜养殖者之间的冲突已加深。我们以绵羊养殖为例，以这种冲突为模型，并在这种情况下，给农民以掠夺性损失的补偿。补偿方案包括固定的每头动物损失价值（事后），但也包括对食肉动物的存在（事前）的补偿。在许多国家，农户不仅受到牲畜的杀害和伤害，而且还受到农作物的损害，因此实行事后补偿。事前付款意味着对环境服务的付款，并且也被广泛采用。在本文的第一部分中，分析了一组农民的放养决策。下一步，介绍了管理食肉动物和补偿计划的自然资源管理局（DNRM）。放牧者和DNRM之间的战略互动被建模为Stackelberg游戏，其中DNRM为领导者。我们发现，DNRM使用事后补偿无益，而仅事前补偿。将游戏的解决方案与社交计划程序的解决方案进行了比较，数值说明表明，事前补偿方案的效率损失很小。

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