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首页> 外文期刊>The European journal of finance >Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder: evidence from China
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Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder: evidence from China

机译：在国家为控股大股东的情况下改善公司治理：来自中国的证据

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摘要

This paper examines changes in values and returns for Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among government agencies, State-owned enterprises and private investors. We find that transfers to all three types of investors result in positive abnormal returns around transfer announcements, even when the transfers do not create a new controlling block holder and when transfers are between State entities. We also find that transfers from State entities to private entities result in larger increases in value and returns than transfers between State-controlled entities - consistent with the superior incentives and expertise of private investors. We conclude that corporate governance can be improved at State-controlled firms by improving incentives and expertise of controlling block holders.
机译：本文考察了政府机构，国有企业和私人投资者之间大宗股份转让宣布之后中国企业价值和回报的变化。我们发现，向所有三种类型的投资者转移都会导致转移公告周围出现正的异常收益，即使转移并未创建新的控制权持有人，而且转移是在国家实体之间进行的。我们还发现，与国家控制实体之间的转移相比，从国家实体向私人实体的转移带来的价值和回报增加幅度更大，这与私人投资者的卓越激励和专业知识相一致。我们得出结论，可以通过改善控制大股东的激励机制和专业知识来改善国有控股公司的公司治理。

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