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首页> 外文期刊>European journal of political economy >Electoral systems and fiscal policy outcomes: Evidence from Poland
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Electoral systems and fiscal policy outcomes: Evidence from Poland

机译：选举制度和财政政策成果：来自波兰的证据

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摘要

This article studies the causal effect of electoral systems on fiscal outcomes using an empirical design exploiting a discontinuity in the application of electoral rules in Polish municipalities in the period 2002-2014. In that period, municipalities followed either majoritarian or proportional (PR) systems, depending on the population size. The article provides evidence that the PR system results in smaller municipalities' own revenue, larger intergovernmental transfers and, consequently, greater vertical fiscal imbalance. It is demonstrated that the reduction in own revenue under the PR system is arguably driven by lower accountability of policy-makers, which leads to lower effort of policy-makers in stimulating local labour markets and entrepreneurship. An increase in intergovernmental grants, in turn, can be explained by a larger share of incumbents affiliated with national political parties.
机译：本文使用实证设计研究选举制度对财政结果的因果关系，该研究利用了2002-2014年间波兰市政当局在选举规则应用上的不连续性。在此期间，市政当局采用多数制或比例制（PR），具体取决于人口规模。该文章提供的证据表明，公关系统导致较小的市政当局自身收入，较大的政府间转移支付，并因此导致更大的纵向财政失衡。事实证明，公关制度下个人收入的减少可以说是政策制定者问责制降低的结果，这导致决策者在刺激当地劳动力市场和企业家精神方面的努力减少。反过来，政府间赠款增加的原因可以归结为与国家政党有联系的在职人员所占的比例更大。

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