• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>German economic review >Germany's New Insider Law: The Empirical Evidence after the First Year
【24h】

Germany's New Insider Law: The Empirical Evidence after the First Year

机译：德国的新内幕法：第一年后的经验证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper investigates insider trading activities in German stocks during the first year following implementation of the new Insider Law on 1 July 2002. It can be observed that insiders act as contrarian investors. They buy stocks after prices have fallen and sell stocks after prices have risen. In general, insider trades are very profitable. A typical stock purchased by an insider yields an abnormal return of almost 3 per cent during the 25 days following the transaction. In contrast, a typical stock that has been sold by insiders achieves an abnormal return of nearly - 3 per cent over the same time period. Outsiders who copy the transactions of insiders can achieve nearly the same abnormal returns. Abnormal returns remain substantial even after transaction costs. The results suggest that prices of stocks in which insiders trade do not seem to be semi-strong efficient.
机译：本文调查了2002年7月1日新《内幕法》实施后第一年德国股票的内幕交易活动。可以看出，内幕人是反向投资者。他们在价格下跌后买进股票，在价格上涨后卖出股票。通常，内幕交易非常有利可图。由内部人员购买的典型股票在交易后的25天内产生近3％的异常收益。相比之下，内部人士出售的典型股票在同一时期内可获得近3％的异常收益。复制内部人交易的外部人可以获得几乎相同的异常收益。即使扣除交易成本，异常收益仍然很可观。结果表明，进行内幕交易的股票价格似乎没有半强效率。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号