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Resolution of the Internal Audit-Based Role Conflicts in Risk Management: Evidence from Signaling Game Analysis

机译：解决内部审计的风险管理中的角色冲突：信号传导博弈分析的证据

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摘要

This study analyzes the inherent role conflicts of internal audit in risk management and clarifies the conditions for the resolution of them using a signaling game model. In the model, we determined five perfect Bayesian Nash equilibriums. The analysis emphasizes the compatibility between the assurance or consulting roles of internal audit and service demand of management. Two equilibriums come to the fore in this respect, and both of them set a game-theoretic ground for the theoretical arguments. Firstly in the face of uncertainty about the risk maturity level of the organization, internal auditors should prefer assurance service in enterprise-wide risk management. The analysis of the equilibriums supports the idea that the assurance role being the core task of internal audit continues to be the key component of the audit profession. Secondly, in "risk-mature" organizations, it is possible to create more value by focusing on the assurance role, whereas for the early stages of risk management, focusing on the consulting role enables one to add more value. The predictions of equilibrium results are in line with this theoretical argument. Furthermore, the equilibrium results imply that the compatibility predicted by the equilibriums features the necessity of proper dialogue mechanisms and especially an effective negotiation process between the internal audit and management. The dialogue and negotiation competency of the relevant parties will enable them to find mutually optimal strategies in accordance with the risk maturity level and ultimately to contribute to the resolution of inherent role conflicts.
机译：本研究分析了风险管理中内部审计中内部审计的固有作用冲突，并阐明了使用信令游戏模型解决它们的条件。在模型中，我们确定了五个完美的贝叶斯纳什均衡。分析强调了内部审计和管理服务需求的保证或咨询角色之间的兼容性。在这方面，两种均衡均达到前面，两者都为理论争论设定了一个游戏理论基础。首先面对组织风险成熟水平的不确定性，内部审计师应该在企业范围的风险管理中更倾向于保证服务。对均衡的分析支持了内部审计核心任务的保证作用仍然是审计专业的关键组成部分。其次，在“风险成熟”组织中，可以通过专注于保证作用来创造更多价值，而对于风险管理的早期阶段，重点关注咨询角色使人们能够增加更多价值。均衡结果的预测符合这种理论论点。此外，均衡结果意味着均衡预测的兼容性具有适当的对话机制的必要性，特别是内部审计和管理之间的有效谈判过程。相关方的对话和谈判能力将使他们根据风险成熟度水平找到相互最佳的策略，最终促进解决内在角色冲突的决议。

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