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User-Centric View of Jamming Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

机译：认知无线电网络中干扰游戏的用户中心视图

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摘要

Jamming games between a cognitive radio enabled secondary user (SU) and a cognitive radio enabled jammer are considered, in which end-user decision making is modeled using prospect theory (PT). More specifically, the interactions between a user and a smart jammer regarding their respective choices of transmit power are formulated as a game under the assumption that the end-user decision making under uncertainty does not follow the traditional objective assumptions stipulated by expected utility theory, but rather follows the subjective deviations specified by PT. Two PT-based static jamming games are formulated to describe how subjective SU and jammer choose their transmit power to maximize their individual signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)-based utilities under uncertainties regarding the opponent’s actions and channel states, respectively. The Nash equilibria of the games are presented under various channel models and transmission costs. Moreover, a PT-based dynamic jamming game is presented to investigate the long-term interactions between a subjective and a smart jammer according to a Markov decision process with uncertainty on the SU’s future actions and the channel variations. Simulation results show that the subjective view of an SU tends to exaggerate the jamming probabilities and decreases its transmission probability, thus reducing the average SINR. On the other hand, the subjectivity of a jammer tends to reduce its jamming probability, and thus increases the SU throughput.
机译：考虑了启用认知无线电的辅助用户（SU）和启用认知无线电的干扰器之间的干扰游戏，其中使用前景理论（PT）对最终用户的决策进行建模。更具体地说，在假设最终用户在不确定性下的决策不遵循预期效用理论所规定的传统客观假设的前提下，将用户与智能干扰器之间关于其各自选择的发射功率的交互作用表述为游戏。而是遵循PT指定的主观偏差。制定了两个基于PT的静态干扰游戏，以描述主观SU和干扰器如何选择其发射功率，以在关于对手的动作和信道状态存在不确定性的情况下最大程度地发挥其基于信噪比（SINR）的效用，分别。在各种渠道模型和传输成本下展示了游戏的纳什均衡。此外，提出了一种基于PT的动态干扰游戏，以根据马尔可夫决策过程调查主观和智能干扰器之间的长期交互作用，而不确定该SU的未来动作和渠道变化。仿真结果表明，SU的主观观点倾向于夸大干扰概率并降低其传输概率，从而降低了平均SINR。另一方面，干扰机的主观性倾向于降低其干扰机率，并因此增加SU吞吐量。

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