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The Place of Self-Respect in a Theory of Justice

机译：自我尊重在正义理论中的地位

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摘要

This essay provides a critical examination of Rawls' (and Rawlsians') conception of self-respect, the social bases of self-respect, and the normative justification of equality in the social bases of self-respect. I defend a rival account of these notions and the normative ideals at stake in political liberalism and a theory of social justice.rnI make the following arguments: (1) I argue that it is unreasonable to take self-respect to be a primary social good, as Rawls and his interpreters characterize it; (2) secondly, drawing on a distinction made by Darwall, I argue that recognition respect provides a far more suitable notion of respect for a theory of justice than Rawls' notion of appraisal respect; (3) thirdly, I argue that Rawls' treatment of self-respect and the social bases of self-respect as empirical conceptions should be rejected in favor of normative notions of a reasonable or justified self-respect and equality in reasonable social bases of self-respect; (4) I argue that Rawls' notions of political liberalism and public reason provide a way of grounding a notion of the reasonable social bases of self-respect in political ideals of the person implicit in modern economic institutions, and family relations, ignored by Rawlsians-but as central to reasonable social bases of self-respect and justice, as Rawlsians' ideal of persons as free and equal citizens.
机译：本文对罗尔斯（和罗尔斯人）的自尊概念，自尊的社会基础以及在自尊的社会基础中平等的规范性辩护提供了批判性的考察。我为这些观念以及政治自由主义和社会正义理论所面临的规范性理想的竞争论者辩护。我提出以下论点：（1）我认为以自尊为主要的社会福利是不合理的。正如罗尔斯和他的翻译所描绘的那样； （2）其次，我根据达沃尔（Darwall）的区别，认为承认尊重提供了比罗尔斯的评价尊重概念更合适的尊重正义理论的概念； （3）第三，我认为，应拒绝罗尔斯将自尊和自尊的社会基础作为经验概念的对待，而支持合理或正当的自尊和公平的合理社会基础的规范性观念。 -尊重; （4）我认为，罗尔斯的政治自由主义和公共理性概念为在现代经济制度和家庭关系中所隐含的人的政治理想中合理的自我尊重的合理社会基础观念提供了一种方法，而罗尔斯主义者则忽略了这一点。 -但作为罗尔斯人关于作为自由和平等公民的人的理想，对于合理的自尊和正义的社会基础至关重要。

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  • 来源
    《Inquiry》 |2009年第2期|127-154|共28页
  • 作者

    GERALD DOPPELT;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, San Diego, Department of Philosophy 0119, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA 92093-5004, USA;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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