SOME REMARKS ON EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN MATRIX GAMES

K.S.MALLIKARJUNA RAO; A.J.SHAIJU

首页> 外文期刊>International game theory review >SOME REMARKS ON EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN MATRIX GAMES

【24h】

SOME REMARKS ON EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN MATRIX GAMES

机译：关于矩阵游戏进化稳定性的一些评论

获取原文

获取原文并翻译 | 示例

掌桥外文数据库（机构版） >>

开具论文收录证明 >>

文献代查 >>

页面导航

摘要
著录项
相似文献
相关主题

摘要

In this article, we revisit evolutionary stability in matrix games.We provide a new direct proof to characterize a pure evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), in games with exactly two pure strategies, as a strategy that is evolutionarily stable against multiple mutations.This direct proof yields generalizations to k × k games which explains why such a characterization is not possible in general.Furthermore, we prove other necessary/sufficient conditions for evolutionary stability against multiple mutations.

机译：在本文中，我们重新审视了矩阵游戏的进化稳定性。我们提供了一个新的直接证据，以将具有两种纯策略的游戏中的纯进化稳定策略（ESS）表征为对多个突变具有进化稳定性的策略。证明产生了对k×k个博弈的概括，这解释了为什么通常不可能进行这种表征。此外，我们证明了针对多个突变的进化稳定性的其他必要/充分条件。

著录项

来源
《International game theory review》 |2013年第4期|1340024-1-1340024-10|共10页
作者
K.S.MALLIKARJUNA RAO; A.J.SHAIJU;
展开▼
作者单位

Industrial Engineering and Operations Research Indian Institute of Technology Bombay Mumbai 400 076, India;

Department of Mathematics Indian Institute of Technology Madras Chennai 600 036, India;

展开▼
收录信息
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类
关键词
ESS; symmetric game; pure and mixed strategies; multiple mutations; Pareto efficient; globally strictly efficient;

机译：ESS;对称博弈纯和混合策略;多个突变;帕累托高效;全球严格有效;

相似文献

外文文献
中文文献
专利

1. Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games [J] . Pe?aJ., LehmannL., N?ldekeG. Journal of Theoretical Biology . 2014,第Null期

机译：多人矩阵游戏的切换和进化稳定性带来的收益
2. Bimatrix games that include interaction times alter the evolutionary outcome: The Owner-Intruder game [J] . Ross Cressman, Vlastimil Kfivan Journal of Theoretical Biology . 2018,第1期

机译：Bimatrix游戏包括交互时间改变了进化结果：业主入侵者游戏
3. Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. [J] . Zhou D, Wu B, Ge H Journal of Theoretical Biology . 2010,第3期

机译：随机演化博弈动力学中的演化稳定性和准平稳策略。
4. Bimatrix Emotional Game Model and Evolutionary Analysis under Non-expected Utility Taking for example thief and guard game [C] . Guoqiang Xiong, Xi Liu 2012 IEEE 5th International conference on management engineering amp; technology of statistics . 2012

机译：非预期效用下的Bimatrix情感博弈模型与演化分析以小偷与后卫博弈为例
5. Embeddings of infinite-dimensional manifold pairs and remarks on stability and deficiency [D] . Sakai Katsuro -1

机译：无限维流形对的嵌入以及稳定性和不足的注记
6. Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games [O] . Joseph Rauch, Jane Kondev, Alvaro Sanchez 2017

机译：合作者在公益博弈中权衡了生态弹性和进化稳定性
7. Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games (new title: Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games) [O] . Wolfgang Leininger 100

机译：抵挡一种手段抵挡所有：子模块游戏的进化稳定性（新标题：抵挡一种意味着抵挡所有：准子模块聚合游戏中的进化稳定性）

SOME REMARKS ON EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN MATRIX GAMES

摘要

著录项

相似文献

相关主题

期刊订阅