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Supply contract design under price volatility and competition

机译：价格波动和竞争下的供应合同设计

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摘要

This study analyses index-based contract designs and contract equilibria in a competitive setting. We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a retailer. Each manufacturer procures a commodity in a spot market and uses such a commodity to produce a product. The manufacturers initially choose either an index-based or fixed-price contract. Thereafter, the manufacturer that adopts an index-based contract designs the contract price on the basis of the spot and forward prices of its input commodity. Finally, the two products are sold through the common retailer. Our analysis indicates that an index-based contract provides a manufacturer with a contingent pricing mechanism, thereby enabling the contract price to respond to the spot price of its input commodity. If only one manufacturer adopts an index-based contract, then the contract price is designed to respond positively to the corresponding spot price, while the contract design constantly benefits the designer but may either benefit or hurt the rival and retailer. If both manufacturers adopt an index-based contract, then the contract price may be designed to respond negatively to the corresponding spot price. The reason is that the manufacturer intends to dampen competition by adopting an opposite contract price design. Further study shows that in equilibrium, both manufacturers consistently adopt an index-based contact if the spot prices are positively correlated. However, differentiated contract strategies may be optimal for manufacturers if the correlation is negative.
机译：本研究分析了竞争环境中基于索引的合同设计和合同均衡。我们考虑一个由两家制造商和零售商组成的双梯级供应链。每个制造商都在现货市场采购商品，并使用此类商品生产产品。制造商最初选择基于索引或固定价格合同。此后，制造商采用基于索引的合同，根据其投入商品的现货和转发价格设计合同价格。最后，这两种产品通过普通零售商销售。我们的分析表明，基于索引的合同为制造商提供了余额的定价机制，从而使合同价格能够响应其投入商品的现货价格。如果只有一个制造商采用基于索引的合同，那么合同价格旨在积极响应相应的现货价格，而合同设计不断享受设计师，但可以效益或损害竞争对手和零售商。如果两个制造商都采用了基于索引的合同，那么合同价格可能旨在对相应的现货价格负面响应。原因是制造商打算通过采用相反的合同价格设计来挫败竞争。进一步的研究表明，如果现货价格正相关，则两种制造商始终采用基于索引的联系。然而，如果相关性为负，则差异化的合同策略可能对制造商最佳。

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