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首页> 外文期刊>Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies >Does Corporate Governance Curb Managers' Opportunistic Behavior of Exploiting Inside Information for Early Exercise of Executive Stock Options?
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Does Corporate Governance Curb Managers' Opportunistic Behavior of Exploiting Inside Information for Early Exercise of Executive Stock Options?

机译：公司治理是否会抑制经理人利用内部信息以尽早行使高管股票期权的机会主义行为？

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摘要

This paper aims to investigate the role of corporate dividend policy and corporate governance in managerial timing decisions with regard to large exercise of executive stock options (ESOs). The findings indicate that the motivations behind managers' decisions to exercise abnormally large ESOs vary depending on the strength of the related corporate governance mechanisms. Managers of weakly governed companies exploit abnormal earnings management when timing large exercises of ESOs. In contrast, managers of well-governed companies behave rationally in timing large exercises of ESOs, carrying them out in years in which their companies significantly raise dividend payouts.
机译：本文旨在研究公司股利政策和公司治理在经理人行使股票期权（ESO）的管理时间决策中的作用。研究结果表明，经理人行使异常大型ESO的决策动机取决于相关公司治理机制的强弱。治理弱的公司的经理在安排大型ESO时会利用异常的收益管理。相比之下，管理完善的公司的经理在安排大型ESO执行时会表现出理性的行为，并在其公司大幅提高股息派发的年份实施这些方案。

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