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Private finance initiative in incomplete contracts: Theory and evidence from Japan

机译：不完整合同中的私人财务倡议：来自日本的理论和证据

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摘要

Private finance initiative (PFI) is a way of creating "public-private partnerships" (PPPs) where private firms are contracted to complete and manage public projects. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how to achieve a desirable procurement contract in PFIs. In the first part, we develop an incomplete contracting model to analyze the effectiveness of PFIs. We show that an appropriate fixed compensation is important in disentangling adverse selection. In the second part, we test the validity of this theoretical implication by case study of "Thalasso Fukuoka" and by cross-sectional analysis on Japan's PFIs. The case study indicates that adverse selection under overestimated value for money (VFM) was a major reason for why the project failed. The cross-sectional analysis also shows that when the local government had overestimated the initial VFM, adverse selection discouraged private companies with higher reservation profits to apply for the project. It suggests that the overestimated initial VFM could make the project less productive even if it did not lead the project to bankrupcy.
机译：私人金融倡议（PFI）是一种创造“公私伙伴关系”（PPPS）的一种方式，私营公司合同完成和管理公共项目。本文的目的是调查如何在PFIS中实现理想的采购合同。在第一部分中，我们开发了不完整的合同模型，以分析PFI的有效性。我们表明，适当的固定补偿对于解开不良选择是重要的。在第二部分中，我们通过对“Thalasso Fukuoka”和日本PFIS的横截面分析来测试这种理论意义的有效性。案例研究表明，金钱高估价值下的不利选择是项目失败为何的主要原因。横截面分析还表明，当地方政府高估了最初的VFM时，不利的选择妨碍了预订利润更高的私营公司来申请该项目。它表明，高估的初始VFM可以使项目更加富有成效，即使它没有领导项目才能承担储存。

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