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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of business and economic perspectives >Corporate Payout Policy, Block Ownership, and the Substitution Hypothesis
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Corporate Payout Policy, Block Ownership, and the Substitution Hypothesis

机译：公司支出政策，大宗所有权和替代假设

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摘要

Grounded in agency theory, this study seeks to ascertain how corporate payouts are influenced by the presence of block ownership. Several studies have argued and empirically shown that both corporate payouts and block ownership function as devices for mitigating agency costs. I contend that, since they play the same role, they may substitute for each other. The evidence in this study shows the substitution effect. Additionally, I decompose blockholders into inside, affiliated, and outside blockholders and find that they affect corporate payouts differently. Finally, the results show that regulation does impact the association between corporate payouts and block ownership.
机译：本研究以代理理论为基础，旨在确定大宗所有权的存在如何影响公司的支出。几项研究已经进行了论证，并从经验上表明，公司支出和区块所有权都是减轻代理成本的工具。我认为，由于它们起着相同的作用，它们可以彼此替代。这项研究中的证据显示了替代作用。另外，我将大股东分解为内部，关联和外部大股东，发现它们对公司支出的影响不同。最后，结果表明，监管确实会影响公司支出与大宗所有权之间的关联。

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