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The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool

机译:认证的可靠性:质量标签作为消费者政策工具

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摘要

Given the large number of certification systems in the food industry, it is surprising that there are only a few research approaches to the economics of certification. Certification schemes are used to ensure marketing claims for unobservable quality attributes. Under asymmetric information, process-oriented quality characteristics such as organic farming, animal welfare, or fair trade raise the question of mislabelling. In the long run, only a reliable control procedure can reduce the risk of food scandals. The article presents a model which includes several starting points to enhance the efficiency of certification systems and the corresponding labels. On the whole, tendencies towards price wars on the certification market and considerable differences in performance reveal the necessity of institutional changes. Strategies for reducing auditors' dependence, intensifying liability, increasing reputation effects, and minimizing audit costs are suggested. Finally, policy implications for public and private monitoring are discussed.
机译:鉴于食品行业中的认证体系数量众多,令人惊讶的是,认证经济学的研究方法很少。认证方案用于确保针对不可观察的质量属性的营销声明。在信息不对称的情况下,面向过程的质量特征(例如有机农业,动物福利或公平贸易)提出了标签错误的问题。从长远来看,只有可靠的控制程序才能减少发生食品丑闻的风险。本文提出了一个模型,其中包括几个起点,以提高认证系统和相应标签的效率。总体而言,认证市场上的价格战倾向和性能上的显着差异表明,必须进行体制改革。提出了减少审计师的依赖性,增加责任,增加声誉影响以及最小化审计成本的策略。最后,讨论了对公共和私人监视的政策含义。

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