• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of economic theory >On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
【24h】

On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

机译：论顺序签约中隐私的最优性

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement.
机译：本文研究了与同一代理人按顺序签约的两个委托人之间的信息交换，就像买方从多个卖方进行购买的情况一样。我们表明，当（a）上游委托人对下游贸易水平不感兴趣时​​，（b）代理人的估值是正相关的，并且（c）下游关系中的偏好是可分离的，那么它对于上游是最佳的委托人为代理商提供完全的隐私权。相反，当违反这些条件中的任何一个条件时，即使下游主体不为信息付费，也存在严格严格要求公开的优先选择。我们还研究了披露对福利的影响，并表明披露并不一定减少两种关系中代理人的剩余，在某些情况下甚至可能带来帕累托改进。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号