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Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information

机译：具有完整和不完整信息的游戏中的无中介交流

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摘要

We study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize S~U(G), the set of outcomes of a game G, that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G. A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G is a game of complete information with five or more players and rational parameters, then S~U(G) coincides with the set of correlated equilibria of G. Next, we demonstrate that if G is a game of incomplete information with at least five players, rational parameters and full support (i.e., all profiles of types have positive probability), then S~U(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G.
机译：我们研究了在完全的和不完全的信息的静态有限游戏中添加无媒介通信的影响。我们表征S〜U（G），即游戏G的结果集，其由廉价谈话扩展的顺序均衡引起。廉价的G谈话扩展是一种形式广泛的游戏，其中玩家在玩G之前进行交流。没有可靠的中介者，玩家交换不直接影响其收益的私人或公共消息。我们首先证明，如果G是具有五个或更多参与者且有理参数的完全信息博弈，则S〜U（G）与G的相关均衡集重合。接下来，我们证明如果G是不完全博弈。至少有五个参与者，合理参数和全力支持的信息（即所有类型的概况都具有正概率），则S〜U（G）等于G的沟通均衡集。

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