A theoretical foundation for games of complete/incomplete contracts

Chenghu Ma; Wing-Keung Wong

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A theoretical foundation for games of complete/incomplete contracts

机译：完整/不完整合同游戏的理论基础

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摘要

This paper provides a theoretical foundation for complete/incomplete contracts to extend game theory for multi-agent interactions. We explain why rational agents may agree to sign incomplete contracts even though signing a complete contract incurs no cost. Some arguments claim that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. Under common assumptions of rationality, an incomplete contract can be the final solution if the agents' attitudes toward uncertainty are not neutral. Assuming that agents can form coalitions by participating in the game and they are uncertainty averse, we develop equilibrium solutions for complete/incomplete contracts in an extensive game of multi-agent interactions.

机译：本文为完全/不完整的合同提供了一个理论基础，以扩展多种代理交互的博弈论。我们解释了为什么理性代理商可以同意签署不完整的合同，即使签署完整的合同是否没有任何费用。一些论据声称，不完整的合同会产生战略性的不确定性。根据合理性的共同假设，如果代理人对不确定性的态度不是中性的，则不完整的合同可以是最终解决方案。假设代理商可以通过参加游戏来形成联盟，并且他们是不确定的厌恶，我们在广泛的多级代理相互作用中开发了完整/不完整合同的均衡解决方案。

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来源
《International Journal of Financial Engineering》 |2021年第1期|2150010.1-2150010.19|共19页
作者
Chenghu Ma; Wing-Keung Wong;
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作者单位

School of Management Fudan University P. R. China;

Department of Finance Fintech & Blockchain Research Center and Big Data Research Center Asia University Taiwan ROC Department of Medical Research China Medical University Hospital Taiwan ROC Department of Economics and Finance The Hang Seng University of Hong Kong Hong Kong;

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正文语种 eng
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关键词
Strategic uncertainty; uncertainty aversion; complete and incomplete contracts; coalition-formation; stability and core-criterion;

机译：战略性的不确定性;不确定性厌恶;完整和不完整的合同;联盟形成;稳定性和核心标准;

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A theoretical foundation for games of complete/incomplete contracts

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