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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty, reduced monitoring,and bad acquisitions
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Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty, reduced monitoring,and bad acquisitions

机译：渡过合并浪潮：不确定性，减少监控和不良收购

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摘要

We show that acquisitions initiated during periods of high merger activity ("merger waves") are accompanied by poorer quality of analysts' forecasts, greater uncertainty, and weaker CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. These conditions imply reduced monitoring and lower penalties for initiating inefficient mergers. Therefore, merger waves may foster agency-driven behavior, which, along with managerial herding, could lead to worse mergers. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the average long-term performance of acquisitions initiated during merger waves is significantly worse. We also find that corporate governance of in-wave acquirers is weaker, suggesting that agency problems may be present in merger wave acquisitions.
机译：我们发现，在合并活动活跃的时期（“合并浪潮”）发起的收购活动伴随着分析师预期的质量较差，不确定性较大以及首席执行官离职绩效对业绩的敏感性较弱。这些条件意味着减少监督并降低启动无效合并的罚款。因此，合并浪潮可能会促进代理驱动的行为，再加上管理人员的放任，可能会导致更糟的合并。与此假设相符，我们发现在并购浪潮中发起的收购的平均长期绩效明显较差。我们还发现，浪潮中收购方的公司治理能力较弱，这表明并购浪潮中可能存在代理问题。

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