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Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases

机译:对检察官和被告人的非正式制裁和刑事案件的处理

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摘要

We model the strategic interaction between a prosecutor and a defendant when non-strategic outside observers rationally use the case disposition (plea bargain, dropped case, acquittal, or conviction) to impose informal sanctions on both parties. Outside observers recognize that error in the legal process (as well as hidden information) means they may misclassify defendants and thereby impose sanctions erroneously. We show that: (1) changes in the level of the formal sanction affect the level of informal sanctions imposed and (2) increases in the informal sanction rates imposed on prosecutors result in changes in the level of informal sanctions imposed on defendants. We also extend the model to allow for a three-outcome verdict (not guilty, not proven, and guilty), sometimes referred to as the "Scottish" verdict. We find that the Scottish verdict is justice-improving in that it benefits innocent defendants, outside observers, and prosecutors in comparison with the standard (two-outcome) verdict. (JEL K4, D8).
机译:当外部非策略性外部观察员合理地利用案件处置(廉价交易,撤销案件,无罪开释或定罪)对双方施加非正式制裁时,我们将对检察官与被告之间的战略互动进行建模。外部观察者认​​识到法律程序中的错误(以及隐藏的信息)意味着他们可能对被告进行错误分类,从而错误地施加了制裁。我们表明:(1)正式制裁水平的变化会影响所施加的非正式制裁的水平;(2)对检察官施加的非正式制裁率的提高会导致对被告实施的非正式制裁的水平发生变化。我们还扩展了模型,以允许进行三结果判决(无罪,无根据和有罪),有时也称为“苏格兰”判决。我们发现苏格兰的判决具有司法公正性,因为与标准(两项结果)判决相比,它使无辜被告,外部观察员和检察官受益。 (JEL K4,D8)。

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