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MODELING PRICING AND SCHEDULING STRATEGIES FOR AIR CARGO CARRIERS AS NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES

机译:航空货运公司作为非合作游戏的定价和调度策略建模

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摘要

To develop efficient pricing and service strategies for air cargo carriers, we formulated air cargo demand as a Multinomial Logit model to reveal forwarders' preferences toward freightage, flight frequency and service reliability. By applying non-cooperative game approach, we solve the market equilibrium to produce optimal freightage of priority and ordinary cargo for forwarders with various shipping volumes as well as the optimal flight schedules of air cargo carriers. In the case study, we found that the leader of air carriers would have not only the largest share, but also the highest freightage for both ordinary and priority cargo. And, with the provision of transfer flights, carriers could further reduce their operating cost by 1% to 3%.
机译:为了制定航空货运承运人的有效定价和服务策略,我们将航空货运需求表述为多项式Lo​​git模型,以揭示货运代理对货运,航班频率和服务可靠性的偏好。通过采用非合作博弈的方法,我们解决了市场均衡问题,从而为各种货运量的货运代理人以及航空货运公司的最佳航班时刻表提供了优先货物和普通货物的最优货运量。在案例研究中,我们发现航空承运人的领导者不仅对普通货物和优先货物都有最大的份额,而且货运量也最高。并且,通过提供中转航班,航空公司可以将运营成本进一步降低1%至3%。

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