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首页> 外文期刊>The journal of risk and insurance >Disease-Specific Moral Hazard and Optimal Health Insurance Design for Physician Services
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Disease-Specific Moral Hazard and Optimal Health Insurance Design for Physician Services

机译：针对医生的疾病特定的道德风险和最佳健康保险设计

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This article analyzes disease-specific moral hazard effects in the demand for physician office visits and explores whether optimal insurance for physician services should be designed to have disease-specific cost sharing. Generalized method of moments is implemented to address the endogeneity of private health insurance, and the nonnegativity and the discreteness of physician services use. The results indicate that the moral hazard effect varies considerably across disease-specific specialist care. The strongest moral hazard (for no-condition related specialist visits) is almost twice the moral hazard effect of the weakest (for chronic condition related specialist visits). Although the findings indicate some variation in the moral hazard effect across disease-specific general practitioner visits, the variation is less considerable. The main policy implication is that optimal insurance for physician services should be designed to have differential cost sharing based on disease status rather than to have uniform cost sharing.
机译：本文分析了对医生就诊的需求中特定疾病的道德风险影响，并探讨了是否应设计针对医生服务的最佳保险以实现特定疾病的成本分摊。实施了通用的矩量法来解决私人健康保险的内生性以及医师服务使用的非负性和离散性。结果表明，在特定疾病的专科护理中，道德风险的影响差异很大。最强的道德风险（对于无条件相关的专家就诊）几乎是最弱的道德风险（对于与慢性病相关的专家就诊）的两倍。尽管这些发现表明，在针对特定疾病的全科医生就诊期间，道德风险影响存在一些差异，但差异并不明显。主要的政策含义是，应将针对医生服务的最佳保险设计为具有基于疾病状况的差异成本分摊，而不是具有统一的成本分摊。

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