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首页> 外文期刊>The journal of technology transfer >R&D subsidy games: a cost sharing approach vs. reward for performance
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R&D subsidy games: a cost sharing approach vs. reward for performance

机译：研发补贴游戏：成本分摊方法与绩效奖励

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This paper investigates government subsidy games for private sector research and development (R&D) in a two-country two-firm intra-industry trade model. Two funding structures are compared: "cost sharing" vs. "reward for performance." Both the theoretical evidence and the results of a Monte Carlo simulation suggest that cost sharing is associated with higher social surplus and quality improvement because it prompts the firm to do more R&D. In a cost sharing program government and firm R&D are always complements. In the reward for performance program government and firm R&D may be complements, but are usually substitutes. In the Monte Carlo results the average firm contribution to R&D expenditure is actually negative with a reward for performance funding structure—raising the question of whether it might be construed as corporate welfare. Finally, the paper characterizes funding priorities for both structures in the case when subsidy dollars are scarce and when they are not.
机译：本文以两个国家的两个公司的行业内贸易模型研究政府对私营部门研发的补贴博弈。比较了两种筹资结构：“成本分摊”与“绩效奖励”。理论证据和蒙特卡洛模拟的结果均表明，成本分摊与较高的社会剩余和质量改善相关，因为它促使企业进行更多的研发。在成本分摊计划中，政府和公司的研发始终是互补的。在绩效计划的奖励中，政府和企业的研发可能是互补的，但通常是替代品。在蒙特卡洛结果中，公司平均对R＆D支出的贡献实际上是负的，这是对绩效资金结构的奖励-提出了一个问题，即是否可以将其解释为公司福利。最后，本文描述了两种情况，即在补贴资金稀缺和没有补贴资金的情况下，两种结构的资金优先事项。

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