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Asymmetric Information And Returns To Reputation In Online Auctions

机译:不对称信息和在线拍卖中的声誉回报

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摘要

In this paper, we explore whether seller reputation can help alleviate asymmetric information in Internet online auctions, using Taiwanese data. This study reveals that the influence of seller reputations on prices is statistically significant, indicating little cultural difference in online auction behaviors, especially the attitude towards seller reputation. Although negative scores do not affect auction prices in full sample regressions, the impact of negative scores becomes statistically significant in the separated sample (low-reputation auctions). Bidders are cautious about sellers who have not built enough reputation.
机译:在本文中,我们探讨了使用台湾数据,卖方声誉是否可以帮助缓解Internet在线拍卖中的不对称信息。这项研究表明,卖方声誉对价格的影响具有统计学意义,表明在线拍卖行为中的文化差异很小,尤其是对卖方声誉的态度。尽管负分数不会影响完整样本回归中的拍卖价格,但是负分数的影响在分离样本中(低声誉拍卖)在统计上变得显着。投标人对没有建立足够声誉的卖方保持谨慎。

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