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首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences
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Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences

机译：时间不一致偏好的委托 - 代理问题的最佳努力

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摘要

This paper incorporates an agent's time-inconsistent preferences into the Sannikov (2008) contract model to explore the effects of an agent's preferences on his own behaviors: the incentive effort choice, the optimal retirement time and the consumption flow during his whole career life. We find the agent's time inconsistency makes it difficult for him to be motivated and makes him need more compensation. An agent's time-inconsistency erodes both the principal and his own income. The time-inconsistent agent will choose a lower incentive effort level, retire at an earlier time and have a lower consumption flow compared with his time-consistent peer. The time-inconsistent preference exactly influences the agents behavior and makes the agency problem more serious. Therefore, the firm has to cost more to stimulate such a time-inconsistent agent, which will damage the firms profits, as well as the efficiency.
机译：本文将代理商的时间 - 不一致的偏好纳入Sannikov（2008）合同模型，以探讨代理人偏好对他自己行为的影响：激励努力选择，最佳的退休时间和整个职业生涯中的消费流动。我们发现代理人的时间不一致使他难以成为动力，让他需要更多的补偿。代理人的时间 - 不一致侵蚀了本金和自己的收入。时间不一致的代理人将选择较低的激励措施水平，在较早的时间退休，与他的时间一致的同行相比较低的消费流量。时间不一致的偏好精确地影响了代理行为，使原子能机构的问题更严重。因此，该公司必须花费更多的时间来刺激这种时间不一致的代理，这将损害公司利润，以及效率。

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