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首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >The impact of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firms' performance and profitability
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The impact of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firms' performance and profitability

机译：基于任命的首席执行官联系对公司绩效和盈利能力的影响

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This paper investigates whether the performance variables of newly added intangible capital elements give the appointment relationship a deeper impact on the firms' performance and profitability. We document that after correcting for endogeneity, when considering intangible capital, Total Q is a better proxy than Tobin's Q for explaining the effect of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firm performance and profitability. Furthermore, we show that the influence of directors on company performance and profitability is more important than that of executives or managers. We also find that the stronger the appointment relationship, the worse the company's performance and profitability. We further provide a series of alternative interpretations and robustness test evidence showing that intangible capital is more important for high technology and internet firms than industrial firms. Further, we find that the greater the number of executives appointed by the CEO, the better the firm's research and development, but the worse the firm's investment policy.
机译：本文调查了新增无形资本要素的性能变量是否给予预约关系对公司的绩效和盈利能力更深入。我们记录了在纠正内核性后，在考虑无形资本后，总Q比Tobin Q更好，以解释基于任命的首席执行期关联对公司性能和盈利能力的影响。此外，我们表明，董事对公司绩效和盈利能力的影响比高管或经理更重要。我们还发现，预约关系越强，公司的表现和盈利能力越差。我们进一步提供了一系列替代解释和稳健性测试证据，表明无形资本对高科技和互联网公司比工业公司更重要。此外，我们发现，首席执行官所指定的高管人数越大，公司的研发越好，而且该公司的投资政策越来越差。

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