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首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >CEO overconfidence and labor investment efficiency
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CEO overconfidence and labor investment efficiency

机译：首席执行官过度信任和劳动力投资效率

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摘要

We examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on labor investment efficiency (LIE). The findings suggest that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have lower LIE. The findings are robust to alternative measures of CEO overconfidence and LIE and after accounting for endogeneity and CEO experience, age, managerial ability, high tech industry, and economic recession. Further analysis shows that: i) our findings are not due to the relation between net hiring and contemporaneous non-labor investments and the difference between high- and low-skilled labor, ii) firms with more analyst following, financially constrained firms, and firms located in states with wrongful discharge laws force CEOs to invest more efficiently in labor. In contrast, firms with dominant CEOs or facing high economic policy uncertainty are less efficient in labor investments, iii) firms with overconfident CEOs exhibit higher labor cost stickiness than those of non-overconfident CEOs, and iv) a lower LIE caused by CEO overconfidence has negative impacts on a firm's future profitability.
机译：我们研究CEO对劳动力投资效率（LIE）的影响。调查结果表明，与过度自信的首席执行官的公司更有可能具有较低的谎言。调查结果是CEO的替代措施的强大，过度控制和撒谎，在内核性和CEO经验，年龄，管理能力，高科技产业和经济衰退之后。进一步的分析表明：i）我们的研究结果不是由于净雇用和同期非劳动力投资与高低和低技能劳工，II）公司之间的差异，以及更多分析师遵循的经济限制公司和公司位于有错误的排放法武力首席执行官的州位于劳动力方面更有效地投资。相比之下，具有主导首席执行官或面临高经济政策不确定性的公司在劳动力投资中较低的效率较低，III公司与过度自信的首席执行官的公司比非过度自信的首席执行官和IV的公司展现出更高的劳动力成本粘性，而第四次）由首席执行官过度自信引起的较低谎言对公司未来盈利能力的负面影响。

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