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首页> 外文期刊>Pacific-Basin Finance Journal >Independent directors, non-controlling directors, and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from Chinese non-state owned enterprises
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Independent directors, non-controlling directors, and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from Chinese non-state owned enterprises

机译：独立董事，非控股董事和高管绩效薪酬敏感性：来自中国非国有企业的证据

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摘要

We investigate the monitoring effect of different types of board directors on executive pay-for performance sensitivity in Chinese non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We find that the board representation of non-controlling shareholders has a positive impact on executive pay for-performance sensitivity, while independent directors have a negative impact on pay-for performance sensitivity. We further find that the positive effect of non-controlling directors is mediated by the ownership level of non-controlling shareholders, and by the controlling shareholder-manager duality. Our empirical evidence suggests that non-controlling directors have a monitoring effect in Chinese non-SOEs, and independent directors do not. Finally, we document that when non-controlling shareholders have relatively high ownership, non-controlling directors are better able to monitor firms' operations, which in turn leads to better firm performance. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：我们调查了不同类型的董事会对中国非国有企业（non-SOEs）对高管人员薪酬绩效敏感性的监控效果。我们发现，非控股股东的董事会代表对高管绩效薪酬敏感度产生积极影响，而独立董事对绩效薪酬敏感度产生消极影响。我们进一步发现，非控股董事的积极影响是由非控股股东的所有权水平和控股股东-经理双重性介导的。我们的经验证据表明，非控制董事对中国的非国有企业具有监督作用，而独立董事则没有。最后，我们证明，当非控股股东拥有相对较高的所有权时，非控股董事能够更好地监控公司的运营，从而提高公司绩效。 （C）2017 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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