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首页> 外文期刊>Psychological Review >Suppositions, Extensionality, and Conditionals: A Critique of the Mental Model Theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)
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Suppositions, Extensionality, and Conditionals: A Critique of the Mental Model Theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)

机译：假设，可扩展性和条件性：对约翰逊·莱尔德和伯恩的心理模型理论的批判（2002）

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摘要

P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne (2002) proposed an influential theory of conditionals in which mental models represent logical possibilities and inferences are drawn from the extensions of possibilities that are used to represent conditionals. In this article, the authors argue that the extensional semantics underlying this theory is equivalent to that of the material, truth-functional conditional, at least for what they term "basic" conditionals, concerning arbitrary problem content. On the basis of both logical argument and psychological evidence, the authors propose that this approach is fundamentally mistaken and that conditionals must be viewed within a suppositional theory based on what philosophical logicians call the Ramsey test. The Johnson-Laird and Byrne theory is critically examined with respect to its account of basic conditionals, nonbasic conditionals, and counterfactuals.
机译：P. N. Johnson-Laird和R. M. J. Byrne（2002）提出了一种有条件的有条件理论，其中心理模型代表逻辑可能性，并且从用来表示条件的可能性扩展中得出推论。在本文中，作者认为，该理论的基础扩展语义与实质性的，具有真函数性的条件等同，至少就他们所谓的“基本”条件而言，涉及任意问题的内容。在逻辑论证和心理学证据的基础上，作者提出这种方法从根本上是错误的，必须在基于哲学逻辑学家所谓的拉姆齐检验的假设理论中观察条件。关于基本条件，非基本条件和反事实的论述，对约翰逊-莱尔德和伯恩理论进行了严格审查。

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