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Horizontal mergers and innovation in concentrated industries

机译：集中行业的横向合并与创新

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It is an open question in antitrust economics whether allowing dominant firms to acquire smaller rivals is ultimately helpful or harmful to the long run rate of innovation and therefore long-term consumer welfare. I develop a framework to study this question in a dynamic oligopoly model where firms endogenously engage in investment, entry, exit and mergers. Firms produce vertically differentiated goods, compete by innovating on product quality, and can acquire rival firms to gain market power. In a benchmark model, mergers are modeled to be exclusively harmful to consumers in the short run by reducing competition and increasing prices. Despite this, under standard industry settings it is possible to show that the prospect of a buyout creates a powerful incentive for firms to preemptively enter the industry and invest to make themselves an attractive merger partner. The result is significantly higher rate of innovation with mergers than without and significantly higher long-run consumer welfare as well. Further results explore the circumstances under which this result is likely to hold. In order for the long run increase in innovation to outweigh the short run harm to consumers caused by mergers, entry costs must be low, entrants and incumbents must both have the ability to innovate rapidly, and the degree of horizontal product differentiation must be low. Alternatively, when dominant firms can directly incorporate the acquired firm's innovation into their own product, mergers will typically benefit consumers in both the short run and long run.
机译：在反托拉斯经济学中，一个悬而未决的问题是，允许主导企业收购较小的竞争对手最终对长期创新率以及长期消费者福利是否有所帮助或有害。我开发了一个框架来研究动态寡头模型中的这个问题，在这种模型中，企业内生地进行投资，进入，退出和合并。企业生产垂直差异化的商品，通过创新产品质量进行竞争，并可以收购竞争对手以获得市场支配力。在基准模型中，合并被建模为通过减少竞争和提高价格在短期内完全对消费者有害。尽管如此，在标准的行业环境下，仍有可能表明收购的前景为企业抢先进入该行业并进行投资以使其成为有吸引力的合并伙伴提供了强大的动力。结果是与没有合并相比，有合并的创新率要高得多，并且长期消费者的福利也要高得多。进一步的结果探讨了在何种情况下可能会保持该结果。为了使创新的长期增长超过合并带来的对消费者的短期伤害，进入成本必须低廉，进入者和在位者都必须具有快速创新的能力，并且横向产品差异化程度必须低。另外，当优势企业可以将收购的企业的创新直接纳入自己的产品中时，合并通常会在短期和长期内使消费者受益。

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