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Job choice in academia

机译:学术界的工作选择

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摘要

The asymmetric international mobility of talented scientists is well documented, yet there is little evidence about the reasons why scientists choose particular jobs. Building on an extended human capital model of science, we unify a dispersed literature relevant for job choice to formulate hypotheses which we test in a unique international quasi-experiment among more than 10,000 researchers. We find that attractive jobs satisfy researchers' "taste for science" and increase their expected scientific productivity, responding to both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. In particular, while salaries, research funding and working with stimulating peers matter, we provide unique estimates of the importance of organisational and institutional factors: early stage researchers are willing to trade off a substantial amount of salary for early independence and tenure perspectives; later stage researchers favour jobs which make it easy to take up new lines of research. Research-only positions are considered as less attractive than jobs with a moderate amount of teaching. Our findings have important implications for the organisational design of research universities and the competitiveness of European science in light of the brain drain of highly talented scientists towards the U.S.
机译:有才华的科学家在国际上的不对称流动得到了充分的证明,但很少有证据表明科学家选择特定工作的原因。在扩展的人力资本科学模型的基础上,我们统一了与工作选择相关的分散文献,以提出假设,并在10,000多名研究人员的独特国际准实验中对其进行了检验。我们发现有吸引力的工作满足了研究人员的“科学趣味”,并提高了他们对内在动机和外在动机的预期科学生产率。尤其是,在薪金,研究经费以及与激励同龄人的关系很重要的同时,我们提供了对组织和机构因素重要性的独特估计:早期研究人员愿意为早期独立性和任期观点权衡大量薪水;后期的研究人员偏爱可以轻松开展新研究领域的工作。仅研究职位被认为比具有中等教学水平的工作吸引力低。我们的发现对于研究型大学的组织设计和欧洲科学技术的竞争力具有重要意义,因为高水平的科学家流向了美国。

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