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Filing behaviour regarding essential patents in industry standards

机译：有关行业标准中基本专利的申报行为

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摘要

This article addresses companies' filing behaviour in respect of patents relevant for standard-setting ("essential patents"). We discuss applicants' incentives to achieve conformity of patent applications with technology standards under development. Based on these incentive structures, we hypothesise that the claims of essential patents are amended more often than those of comparable patents. Additionally, we argue that applicants have incentives to delay the grant decision. As a result, essential patents are hypothesised to have longer pendency times than comparable patents. This implies more possibilities for applicants to exploit the flexibility within the patent application process to amend the claims of pending patent applications. For empiric validation, we use procedural patent data from the European patent application process. We adopt a one-to-one matching approach, pairing essential patents in telecommunications with control patents on the matching criteria of technology class, filing date and applicant name. Additionally, we compare these essentials with patents from companies that do not hold standards-relevant patents. We detect higher numbers of claims and amendments to claims as well as other relevant characteristics for the essential patents. Using survival analysis, we show that the higher numbers of amendments and claims and the higher share of X references are responsible for higher pendency times, since they significantly decrease hazard rates in the survival analysis. We discuss the general implications for the functioning of the patent system and address the detrimental effects caused by the high degree of uncertainty generated by these filing strategies. Possible solutions such as better co-ordination are devised.
机译：本文讨论了公司在与标准制定相关的专利（“必要专利”）方面的归档行为。我们讨论了申请人为使专利申请与正在开发的技术标准保持一致的动机。基于这些激励机制，我们假设基本专利的权利要求比可比较专利的权利要求被更频繁地修改。此外，我们认为申请人有动机延迟拨款的决定。结果，假设基本专利的等待时间比同类专利更长。这意味着申请人有更多的可能性利用专利申请过程中的灵活性来修改未决专利申请的权利要求。对于经验验证，我们使用来自欧洲专利申请过程的程序专利数据。我们采用一对一的匹配方法，根据技术类别，申请日期和申请人名称的匹配标准，将电信中的基本专利与控制专利进行配对。此外，我们将这些要点与没有标准相关专利的公司的专利进行了比较。我们发现更多的权利要求和对权利要求的修改以及基本专利的其他相关特征。使用生存分析，我们发现，修正案和索赔的数量越多，X引用的比例越高，则导致未完成时间越长，因为它们显着降低了生存分析中的危险率。我们讨论了专利制度运作的一般含义，并解决了由这些备案策略产生的高度不确定性所造成的不利影响。设计了可能的解决方案，例如更好的协调。

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  • 来源
    《Research policy》 |2012年第1期|p.216-225|共10页
  • 作者

    Florian Berger; Knut Blind; Nikolaus Thumm;

  • 作者单位

    Berlin University of Technology, Chair of Innovation Economics, Sekr. VWS2, Milller-Breslau-Strasse, D-10623 Berlin, Germany;

    Berlin University of Technology, Chair of Innovation Economics, Sekr. VWS2, Milller-Breslau-Strasse, D-10623 Berlin, Germany,Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems FOKUS, Berlin, Germany,Erasmus Research Institute of Management, Rotterdam School of Management, The Netherlands;

    European Patent Office, Chief Economist, Erhardtstr. 27, D-80469 Mtinchen, Germany;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    intellectual property rights; patent strategy; standards; telecommunication;

    机译：知识产权;专利策略;标准;电讯;

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