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首页> 外文期刊>Review of accounting studies >The informativeness of pro forma and street earnings: an examination of information asymmetry around earnings announcements
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The informativeness of pro forma and street earnings: an examination of information asymmetry around earnings announcements

机译：备考和街头收益的信息性：围绕收益公告的信息不对称性的检查

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Using adverse-selection cost as a proxy for information asymmetry, we find evidence that non-GAAP earnings numbers issued by management (pro forma earnings) and analysts (street earnings) improve price discovery. First, information asymmetry before an earnings announcement is positively associated with the probability of a non-GAAP earnings number at the forthcoming earnings announcement. Second, the post-announcement reduction in information asymmetry is greater when managers or analysts issue non-GAAP earnings at the earnings announcement and when the magnitude of the non-GAAP earnings adjustment is larger. Our results suggest that earnings adjustments by analysts and managers increase the amount and precision of earnings information and help to narrow information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders following earnings announcements. Alternatively, the findings may be attributable to characteristics of non-GAAP firms and overall better reporting quality for those firms rather than non-GAAP earnings disclosure per se.
机译：使用逆向选择成本代替信息不对称，我们发现有证据表明，管理层（备考收入）和分析师（街道收入）发布的非GAAP收入数字可改善价格发现。首先，收益公告之前的信息不对称与即将公布的收益公告中非GAAP收益数字的概率呈正相关。其次，当经理或分析师在收益公告中发布非GAAP收益且非GAAP收益调整的幅度较大时，公告后信息不对称性的减少幅度更大。我们的结果表明，分析师和经理人进行的收益调整会增加收益信息的数量和准确性，并有助于缩小收益公告后知情交易者和不知情交易者之间的信息不对称性。或者，这些发现可能归因于非GAAP公司的特征以及这些公司的总体报告质量更好，而不是非GAAP收益披露本身。

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