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A Game-Theoretical Model to Improve Process Plant Protection from Terrorist Attacks

机译：一个博弈论模型，可提高过程工厂对恐怖袭击的保护

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摘要

The New York City 9/11 terrorist attacks urged people from academia as well as from industry to pay more attention to operational security research. The required focus in this type of research is human intention. Unlike safety-related accidents, security-related accidents have a deliberate nature, and one has to face intelligent adversaries with characteristics that traditional probabilistic risk assessment techniques are not capable of dealing with. In recent years, the mathematical tool of game theory, being capable to handle intelligent players, has been used in a variety of ways in terrorism risk assessment. In this article, we analyze the general intrusion detection system in process plants, and propose a game-theoretical model for security management in such plants. Players in our model are assumed to be rational and they play the game with complete information. Both the pure strategy and the mixed strategy solutions are explored and explained. We illustrate our model by an illustrative case, and find that in our case, no pure strategy but, instead, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
机译：纽约市的9/11恐怖袭击促使学术界和工业界的人们更加重视运营安全研究。这种研究的重点是人类的意图。与安全相关的事故不同，安全相关的事故具有蓄意的性质，因此必须面对具有传统概率风险评估技术无法处理的特征的聪明对手。近年来，能够处理聪明玩家的博弈论数学工具已以多种方式用于恐怖主义风险评估。在本文中，我们分析了过程工厂中的通用入侵检测系统，并提出了一种用于此类工厂中安全管理的博弈模型。我们模型中的玩家被认为是理性的，他们在玩游戏时会获得完整的信息。探索和解释了纯策略和混合策略解决方案。我们通过一个说明性的案例来说明我们的模型，发现在我们的案例中，不存在纯粹的策略，而是存在混合策略纳什均衡。

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  • 来源
    《Risk analysis》 |2016年第12期|2285-2297|共13页
  • 作者

    Zhang Laobing; Reniers Genserik;

  • 作者单位

    Delft Univ Technol, Safety & Secur Sci Grp S3G, Fac Technol Policy & Management, NL-2628 BX Delft, Netherlands;

    Delft Univ Technol, Safety & Secur Sci Grp S3G, Fac Technol Policy & Management, NL-2628 BX Delft, Netherlands|Univ Antwerp, Fac Appl Econ, Antwerp Res Grp Safety & Secur ARGoSS, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium|KULeuven, CEDON, Campus Brussels, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Game theory; process plant security; strategic adversaries; terrorism risk assessment;

    机译：博弈论;过程工厂安全;战略对手;恐怖主义风险评估;

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