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The role of formal contracts with weak legal enforcement: A study in the Chinese context

机译：执法不力的正式合同的作用：中国背景下的一项研究

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摘要

This article explores in depth the mechanisms through which formal contracts and relational governance complement each other, focusing on the role played by formal contracts in transitional economies characterized by weak legal enforcement and a culture oriented around informal ties. The findings, drawn from case studies conducted at five firms across China, suggest that formal contracts are used even when they are not legally enforceable because by defining the rights and obligations in an exchange, contracts reinforce reciprocity in long-term exchange relationships. Although this role of contracts has not previously been clarified in the literature, it is particularly important in China because its cultural traditions prioritize reciprocity. The findings have implications for developing a theory of inter-firm relationship governance and optimal contracting, particularly in transitional economies.
机译：本文深入探讨了正式合同和关系治理相互补充的机制，着重探讨了正式合同在以执法不力和非正式关系为特征的转型经济中所扮演的角色。从在中国五家公司进行的案例研究得出的调查结果表明，即使正式合同不具有法律强制性，也要使用正式合同，因为通过定义交换中的权利和义务，合同可以增强长期交换关系中的互惠性。尽管合同的这种作用以前没有在文献中得到澄清，但在中国尤为重要，因为中国的文化传统优先考虑互惠。这些发现对发展公司间关系治理和最优契约理论尤为重要，特别是在转型经济体中。

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