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Combining formal and informal contract enforcement in a developed legal system: a latent class approach

机译：在发达的法律体系中将正式和非正式合同执行相结合：潜在的类别方法

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摘要

How do firms combine a broad range of contract enforcement mechanisms into coherent governance structures? How often are distinct structures used in an economy? We develop a new empirical approach, based on latent class analysis, to answer these questions. Economy-level data from Hungary are used to derive a data-driven typology of contractual governance between firms. The joint use of law, morality, self-enforcing contracts, reputation and community norms is examined. They are shown to be combined into bilateral, third-party or comprehensive governance structures. The crucial governance choice is whether to move beyond bilateralism and, if yes, whether to use a mixture of (formal and informal) third-party mechanisms as a substitute or a complement. Complementarity is much more common. We find no instances of 'impersonal exchange'; the law never stands alone. By implication, economic development may be best understood as a process from a narrower towards a broader set of enforcement mechanisms.
机译：公司如何将广泛的合同执行机制整合到一致的治理结构中？经济中使用不同结构的频率是多少？我们基于潜在类别分析，开发了一种新的经验方法来回答这些问题。来自匈牙利的经济水平数据用于得出企业之间合同治理的数据驱动型。研究了法律，道德，自我执行的合同，声誉和社区规范的联合使用。事实证明，它们被合并为双边，第三方或综合治理结构。关键的治理选择是是否要超越双边主义，如果是，是否要使用（正式和非正式）混合的第三方机制作为替代或补充。互补性更为普遍。我们没有发现“非个人交流”的情况；法律永远不会孤单。言外之意，最好将经济发展理解为一个从较窄的执行机制到较广泛的执行机制的过程。

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