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CONCLUSION

机译:结论

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摘要

A former chief of the General Staff summed up the strategic issue around the Afghan campaign in a single question to which he himself had no satisfactory answer. 'How did we go', he asked, 'from the original intention to support the UN's ISAF mission in 2001 to the sombre spectacle of repatriating dead soldiers through Wootton Bassett ten years later?'1 The question goes to the heart of how a political intention is arrived at and how it then finds expression, in this case largely through the military, to become 'policy'. The military establishment must necessarily be the servant of political direction. So did the original political intention in Afghanistan set a strategic course, after which all was merely tactical? Or were there missed opportunities to respond differently and to refine the original strategic intention to shape the flow of events and impose a better outcome to that which occurred by the end of 2006? These papers have sought to provide evidence to address this key strategic question.
机译:一位前总参谋长总结了阿富汗战役的战略问题,他本人对此没有满意的答复。他问道,“从2001年支持联合国国际安全援助部队的初衷到十年后通过伍顿·巴塞特(Wootton Bassett)遣返死去士兵的阴暗景象,我们走得怎么样?” 1这个问题的核心是政治如何达成意图,然后如何找到表达方式(在这种情况下主要是通过军事行动)成为“政策”。军事机构必须一定是政治指导的仆人。那么,阿富汗的最初政治意图是否设定了战略路线,而这一切仅仅是战术上的?还是有错过的机会做出不同的反应并完善最初的战略意图,以塑造事件的流程并强加到2006年底发生的事情的更好结果?这些论文试图为解决这一关键战略问题提供证据。

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  • 来源
    《The RUSI journal》 |2011年第appa期|p.81-94|共14页
  • 作者

    MICHAEL CLARKE;

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