...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Theory and Decision >History as a coordination device
【24h】

History as a coordination device

机译：历史作为协调工具

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar coordination games played in the past, possibly by other players. We analyze a simple model in which a large population plays a game that exhibits strategic complementarities. We assume a dynamic process that faces different populations with such games for randomly selected values of a parameter. We introduce a belief formation process that takes into account the history of similar games played in the past, not necessarily by the same population. We show that when history serves as a coordination device, the limit behavior depends on the way history unfolds, and cannot be determined from a-priori considerations.
机译：协调游戏通常具有多重平衡。均衡的选择提出了信念形成的问题：参与者如何产生关于其他参与者行为的信念？本文认为答案在于历史，即过去可能由其他玩家玩过的类似协调游戏的结果。我们分析了一个简单的模型，在该模型中，大量人口玩具有战略互补性的游戏。我们假设使用随机选择的参数值的此类游戏面对不同种群的动态过程。我们介绍了一种信念形成过程，该过程考虑了过去（不一定是同一人群）玩过类似游戏的历史。我们表明，当历史充当协调工具时，极限行为取决于历史展开的方式，并且无法从先验考虑中确定。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号