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Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

机译：谈话不那么便宜：昂贵且离散的通信

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We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model, the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete messages which are ordered by the cost incurred by the sender. We characterize the resulting equilibria without refining out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Subsequently, we apply an adapted version of the no incentive to separate (NITS) condition to our model. We show that if the sender and receiver have aligned preferences regarding the action of the receiver, then NITS only admits the equilibrium with the largest possible number of induced actions. When the preferences between players are not aligned, we show that NITS does not guarantee uniqueness, and we provide an example where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show, this improvement can occur to such an extent that the equilibrium outperforms the Goltsman et al. (J Econ Theory 144:1397–1420, 2009) upper bound for receiver’s payoffs in mediated communication.
机译：我们对有消息的发送者和没有消息的接收者之间的交互进行建模。与经典的廉价谈话设置一样，有信息的玩家会向不知情的接收者发送消息，后者将采取行动影响两个玩家的收益。但是，在我们的模型中，发件人只能通过使用离散消息进行通信，这些消息按发件人的费用来排序。我们在不完善非均衡信念的情况下描述了所得均衡的特征。随后，我们将无动机分离（NITS）条件的改进版本应用于我们的模型。我们表明，如果发送方和接收方在接收方的行为方面具有一致的偏好，那么NITS仅允许具有最大可能数量的诱发行为的均衡。当参与者之间的偏好不一致时，我们表明NITS不能保证唯一性，并且我们提供了一个示例，其中通信成本的增加可以改善通信。正如我们所表明的那样，这种改进的程度可以达到平衡优于Goltsman等人的水平。 （J Econ Theory 144：1397–1420，2009年）中介沟通中的接收者收益上限。

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