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Cordon tolls and competition between cities with symmetric and asymmetric interactions

机译：具有对称和非对称相互作用的城市之间的警戒线收费和竞争

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The aim of this paper is to model the impacts of competition between cities on both the optimal welfare generating tolls and upon longer-term decisions such as business and residential location choices. The research uses a dynamic land use transport interaction model of two neighbouring cities and analyses the impacts by setting up a game between the two cities to maximise the welfare of their own residents. The work builds on our earlier research which studied competition in a small network using a static equilibrium approach for private car traffic without accounting for the land use responses to the change in accessibility. This paper extends the earlier work by setting up a dynamic model which includes active modes of travel and the more usual car and public transport in a realistic twin city setting and assesses the longer term relocation responses. This paper firstly sets out the competition between two hypothetical identical cities i.e. the symmetric case; and then sets out the real world asymmetric case in which the cities are of different size representative of Leeds and Bradford in the UK but equally applicable elsewhere too. We found that the level of interaction between the two cities is a key determinant to the optimal tolls and welfare gains. Our findings show that the competition between cities could lead to a Nash Trap at which both cities are worse off in terms of welfare gains. On the other hand, we found that cities, if regulated, would gain in terms of welfare and yet charge only half the toll compared with tolls under competition. We then show that the effect of competition increases with increased interaction between cities. In terms of residential location, cities with higher charges benefit from an increase in residents, though as with other studies, the relative change in population in response to cordon charging is small. The policy implications are threefold-(i) while there is an incentive to cooperate at local authority level, this is not achieved due to competition; (ii) where cities compete they may fall into a Nash Trap where both cities will be worse off compared to the regulated solution; and (iii) regulation is recommended when there is a strong interaction between the cities but that the benefits of regulation decrease as interaction between cities decreases and the impact of competition is lessened.
机译：本文的目的是模拟城市之间的竞争对产生最佳福利的通行费以及长期决策（如商业和居住地点选择）的影响。该研究使用两个相邻城市的动态土地利用交通互动模型，并通过在两个城市之间建立博弈来分析其影响，以最大程度地提高其本国居民的福利。这项工作是建立在我们较早的研究的基础上的，该研究使用静态均衡方法研究小型网络中的私家车交通竞争，而不考虑土地使用对可及性变化的响应。本文通过建立一个动态模型来扩展早期的工作，该模型包括在现实的双城环境中的主动出行方式以及更平常的汽车和公共交通，并评估了较长期的搬迁响应。本文首先阐述了两个假设相同城市之间的竞争，即对称情况。然后阐述了现实世界中的不对称情况，在这种情况下，城市规模不同，代表了英国的利兹和布拉德福德，但在其他地方也同样适用。我们发现，两个城市之间的互动程度是决定最佳通行费和福利收益的关键因素。我们的研究结果表明，城市之间的竞争可能导致纳什陷阱，这两个城市的福利收益都将恶化。另一方面，我们发现，如果对城市进行管理，则将获得福利方面的好处，而收费仅为竞争下收费的一半。然后我们表明，竞争的效果随着城市之间互动的增加而增加。在居民区方面，收费较高的城市受益于居民数量的增加，尽管与其他研究一样，由于警戒线收费导致的人口相对变化很小。该政策的含义包括三个方面：（i）虽然有在地方当局一级进行合作的动机，但由于竞争而未能实现； （ii）在城市竞争的情况下，它们可能会陷入纳什陷阱，与受控解决方案相比，这两个城市的状况都会更糟； （iii）当城市之间的互动密切时，建议进行监管，但随着城市之间的互动减少，竞争的影响减小，监管的好处就会减少。

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