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Domestic Political Survival anc International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace

机译:国内政治生存与国际冲突:民主对和平有好处吗?

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We build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from abroad. In addition, the leader of a fully democratic country loses the support of the median voter if he attacks a non-hostile country. The result is a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. Using Polity data, we classify countries as full democracies, limited democracies, and dictatorships. For the period 1816-2000, Correlates ofWar data suggest that limited democracies are more aggressive than other regime types, including dictatorships, and not only during periods when the political regime is changing. In particular, a dyad of limited democracies is more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute than any other dyad (including "mixed" dyads, where the two countries have different regime types). Thus, while full democratization might advance the cause of peace, limited democratization might advance the cause of war. We also find that as the environment becomes more hostile, fully democratic countries become more aggressive faster than other regime types.
机译:我们建立了一种博弈论模型,在这种模型中,国内政治忧虑和被攻击的恐惧都可能引发侵略。在该模型中,完全民主制和有限民主制的领导人如果不承受来自国外的威胁,就有失去权力的风险。此外,一个完全民主国家的领导人如果袭击一个非敌对国家,就会失去中位选民的支持。结果是民主与和平之间的非单调关系。使用政治数据,我们将国家分为完全民主国家,有限民主国家和独裁国家。在1816年至2000年期间,战争相关数据表明,有限的民主国家比包括独裁政权在内的其他政权类型更具侵略性,不仅在政治政权发生变化期间。特别是,民主制有限的朝代比其他任何朝代(包括两国具有不同政体类型的“混合”朝代)更可能参与军事化争端。因此,尽管充分的民主化可以促进和平事业,而有限的民主化可以促进战争事业。我们还发现,随着环境变得更加敌对,完全民主的国家比其他政权类型的侵略性更快。

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