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Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games

机译:讨价还价和贡献游戏中的渐进主义

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This paper identifies a source of gradualism in bargaining and contribution games.In the bargaining games we examine,each party can opt out at any time,and the outside option outcome is assumed to depend on the offers made in the negotiation phase.Specifically,we assume that (1) making a concession in the negotiation phase increases the other party's outside option pay-off and (2) the outside option outcome induces an efficiency loss as compared with a negotiated agreement.The main finding is that the mere presence of such history-dependent outside options forces equilibrium concessions in the negotiation phase to be gradual,and the degree of gradualism is characterized.The model also applies to contribution games in which the outside option may be interpreted as the option to implement a partial project using the total contributions made so far.
机译:本文确定了讨价还价博弈和贡献博弈中渐进主义的根源。在我们研究的讨价还价博弈中,每一方都可以随时退出,并且外部期权的结果取决于谈判阶段的报价。假设(1)在谈判阶段做出让步会增加另一方的外部期权收益,并且(2)与谈判协议相比,外部期权结果会导致效率损失。主要发现是仅存在这样的结果与历史有关的外部选择权迫使谈判阶段的均衡让步是渐进的,并体现了渐进主义的程度。该模型也适用于贡献博弈,其中外部选择权可以解释为使用总体实现部分项目的选择权到目前为止的贡献。

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