We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" inthe sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show thatequilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceablefuture transactions unspecified and instead specify which agent has the right to decide thesetransactions. Control rights allow the controlling agent to defer time-consuming deliberations on thosetransactions to a later date, making her less inclined to prolong negotiations over an initial incompletecontract. Still, agents tend to resolve conflicts up-front by writing more complete initial contracts. Amore complete contract can take the form of either a finer adaptation to future contingencies, orgreater coarseness. Either way, conflicts among contracting agents tend to result in excessivelycomplete contracts in the sense that the maximization of joint payoffs would result in less completecontracts.
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