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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

机译：具有道德风险和逆向选择的动态合同

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摘要

We study a novel dynamic principal-agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model, an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task, the agent learns its level of difficulty and then chooses whether to accept or refuse each task in turn and how much effort to exert. Although his decision to accept or refuse a task is publicly known, the agent's effort level is his private information. We characterize optimal contracts and show that the per-period utility of the agent approaches his per-period utility when his skills are publicly known, as the discount factor and the time horizon increase.
机译：我们研究了一种具有道德风险和逆向选择（持续性和重复性）的新型动态委托人设置。在模型中，以其私人信息为技能的代理人面临着一系列有限的任务，一个接一个。在完成每个任务后，代理会了解其难度，然后选择依次接受还是拒绝每个任务以及要付出多少努力。尽管他接受或拒绝任务的决定是众所周知的，但代理的努力程度是他的私人信息。我们对最优合同进行了刻画，并显示了当折扣技巧和时间范围增加时，代理的定期效用接近于其技能的定期效用。

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