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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Endogenous Information Acquisition in CoordinationGames
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Endogenous Information Acquisition in CoordinationGames

机译：CoordinationGames中的内源信息获取

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摘要

In the context of a "beauty-contest" coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and from the average action), players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals. Each signal has an underlying accuracy (how precisely it identifies the state) and a clarity (how easy it is to understand). The unique linear equilibrium has interesting properties: the signals which receive attention are the clearest available, even if they have poor underlying accuracy; the number of signals observed falls as the complementarity of players' actions rises; and, if actions are more complementary, the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium is more public in nature. The consequences of "rational-inattention" constraints on information transmission and processing are also studied.
机译：在“美竞赛”协调游戏（收益取决于从未观察到的状态变量到平均动作的二次距离）的游戏中，玩家选择花多少精力来关注各种信息信号。每个信号都有一个基本的准确性（它精确地识别状态）和一个清晰度（它易于理解）。独特的线性平衡具有有趣的特性：即使基础准确度较差，受到关注的信号也是最清晰的信号。随着玩家行为互补性的提高，观察到的信号数量下降;而且，如果行动更具互补性，那么平衡内生获取的信息在本质上就更加公开。还研究了“理性注意力不足”约束对信息传输和处理的影响。

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