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首页> 外文期刊>WSEAS Transactions on Environment and Development >An incentive mechanism for improving urban water supply system
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An incentive mechanism for improving urban water supply system

机译：完善城市供水系统的激励机制

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摘要

An essential challenge for many developing countries is improvement of water supply system to ensure urban water supply safety and reliability. Penalty, subsidy and water price increase are often considered as the main incentive measures for improving urban water supply system. However, the implementation of these policies is confronting some uncertainties because of the conflicts of involved actors. In order to find the most effective incentive mechanism for improving urban water supply system, this study conducts a game theoretical analysis to analyze the conflicts of interests between municipal government and a water company. The effects of penalty, subsidy and water price increase on behaviors of key stakeholders were obtained. The main findings are that water price and penalty are the effective tools to promote urban water supply system improvement, while subsidy policy is not useful. The conclusion has important policy implication for improving urban water supply system safety.
机译：对许多发展中国家来说，一项基本挑战是改善供水系统，以确保城市供水的安全性和可靠性。罚款，补贴和水价上涨通常被视为改善城市供水系统的主要激励措施。但是，由于相关行为者的冲突，这些政策的实施面临一些不确定性。为了找到最有效的激励机制，以改善城市供水系统，本研究进行了博弈论分析，以分析市政府和自来水公司之间的利益冲突。获得了罚款，补贴和水价上涨对主要利益相关者行为的影响。主要发现是水价和罚款是促进城市供水系统改善的有效工具，而补贴政策却没有用。该结论对改善城市供水系统安全具有重要的政策意义。

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