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Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs

机译：装运前检验程序中的相互监督

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摘要

Preshipment inspection (PSI) programmes are implemented in many developing countries to assist governments in the collection of revenue at their borders. These programs consist of the delegation of the inspection of imports to a private firm. To studythese PSI programmes, we develop a hierarchical agency model in which the government authority can rely on two supervisors, namely the private inspection firm and the customs administration, to control importers' declarations. The government's optimal contractus fully characterized. We devote some attention to the inspection policy and its comparative statics properties. In particular, we identify the situations in which PSI programmes are revenue enhancing. We also discuss the reconciliation policy, i.e. what to do in case of conflicting inspection reports by the inspection firm and the customs administration. In the optimal mechanism, mutual supervision between the inspection firm and the customs administration is used to provide adequate incentivesto all parties.
机译：在许多发展中国家实施了装运前检查（PSI）计划，以协助政府在其边境收取税收。这些方案包括将进口检验委托给一家私人公司。为了研究这些PSI程序，我们开发了一种分级代理模型，在该模型中，政府机构可以依靠私人检查公司和海关总署的两个监督者来控制进口商的申报。政府的最优契约具有充分的特征。我们将重点放在检查策略及其比较静态特性上。特别是，我们确定了PSI计划可以增加收入的情况。我们还将讨论对帐政策，即在检查公司和海关总署的检查报告相抵触的情况下应采取的措施。在最佳机制中，检查公司与海关之间的相互监督被用来为各方提供足够的激励。

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