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Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets

机译：信贷市场的议价能力和执法

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摘要

In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of "bargaining power" between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down.But if the borrower has less power than this threshold, hej expected payoff must come down with her outside options. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say, by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all "bad" states in which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower's consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within asingle model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way.
机译：在具有强制执行约束的信贷市场中，我们研究了潜在违约者的外部选择的变化对信贷合同条款以及借款人收益的影响。结果关键取决于借款人与贷方之间的“议价能力”分配。我们证明存在一个相对权重的关键阈值，使得如果借款人的权力超过该阈值，则只要其外部选择权下降，其预期效用就必须增加;但是如果借款人的权力小于此阈值，则预期收益必须考虑她的外部选择。在前一种情况下，例如，由于更好的执行而导致的外部选择权的恶化，必定会导致国家或然消费的洛伦兹改善。特别是，在所有借贷的“不良”状态下，借款人的消费都在增加。相反，在后一种情况下，借款人的消费必须下降，至少对于所有不良状态而言。单一模型中的这些不同发现使我们能够以统一的方式解释有关信贷市场的现有文献。

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