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首页> 外文期刊>Biology & philosophy >The many meanings of 'cost' and 'benefit:' biological altruism, biological agency, and the identification of social behaviours
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The many meanings of 'cost' and 'benefit:' biological altruism, biological agency, and the identification of social behaviours

机译：“成本”和“效益：”生物利他主义，生物学局和社会行为的识别众多含义

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The puzzle of how altruism can evolve has been at the center of recent debates over Hamilton's Rule, inclusive fitness, and kin-selection. In this paper, I use recent debates over altruism and Hamilton's legacy as an example to illustrate a more general problem in evolutionary theory that has philosophical significance; I attempt to explain this significance and to draw a variety of conclusions about it. The problem is that specific behaviours and general concepts of organism agency and intentionality are defined in terms of concepts of evolutionary costs and benefits, and these terms have determined the role that agency should play in evolutionary explanation. However, costs, benefits, and agency are not only or even best conceived through evolutionary effects in a biological context. The paper proceeds as follows: first, I explain how the issue of agency relates to the evolutionary puzzle of altruism. Next, I discuss how questions about agency have figured in recent debates over Hamilton's legacy. In the final section, I argue that Denis Walsh's situated Darwinism, which attempts to return the organism to central status in biological explanation, offers a more productive route for thinking about different forms of costs, benefits, and agency. Finally, I argue that the upshot of all this is that there may be many different, and equally valid, ways to express what organisms are doing and how they are behaving based on different currencies of cost and benefiteven if these may stand in some tension. I illustrate this through returning to the case of altruism and using examples to show that even in non-humans there can be many forms of altruism, even if they are not all biological altruism as defined in the conventional evolutionary terms.
机译：利他主义如何发展的难题已经在近期汉密尔顿规则，包容性健身和亲属选择的争论中心。在本文中，我使用最近的利他主义和汉密尔顿的遗产辩论，以说明具有哲学意义的进化理论中更一般的问题;我试图解释这种意义并得出各种结论。问题是，在进化成本和福利的概念方面定义了有机体代理和意向的具体行为和一般概念，这些条款已经确定了机构应该在进化解释中发挥作用。然而，成本，福利和代理商不仅是通过生物学背景下的进化效应而最佳地构思。本文进行如下所示：首先，我解释了机构问题如何与利他主义的进化益智有关。接下来，我讨论了关于近期哈密尔顿遗产的辩论的关于代理商的问题。在最后一节中，我认为丹尼斯沃尔什的位于达尔文主义，试图将有机体恢复到生物解释中的中央地位，为不同形式的成本，福利和代理商思考提供更加富有成效的途径。最后，我认为这一切的结果是可能有许多不同，同样有效的方式，表达了哪些有机体正在做什么以及如果这些可能存在于某些紧张的情况下，他们如何基于不同的成本货币和福利等行为。我通过返回利他主义的情况并使用例子表明即使在非人类中，也可以有许多形式的利他主义，即使它们不是传统的进化术语中所定义的所有生物利他主义。

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