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Methods of Solving the Theoretic Game Models for Coordinating Interests in Regulating the Fishery Industry

机译：解决对渔业调节兴趣的理论游戏模型的方法

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摘要

Dynamic theoretic game models for the coordination of private and social interests of agents in the concept of the sustainable development (SD) of the dynamic system controlled by them are investigated. Within this concept, the hierarchical control mechanisms—methods of administrative control and inducement—are formalized as solutions of hierarchical differential games with the phase constraints reflecting the requirements for the state of the controlled dynamic system providing the conditions for SD. Administrative control involves the impact of the leading player (the subject of managing SD) on the set of admissible controls for the followers (the subject of the impact on the controlled dynamic system); and the incentive, on his payoff function. Mechanisms of administrative and economic management are formalized as computer imitation scenarios. The dynamic models considered in the article are the development of the models for the coordination of private and social interests proposed by Yu.B. Germeyer and I.A. Vatel. Numerical calculations are carried out and a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of these control mechanisms for the fisheries’ model is fulfilled.
机译：调查了由他们控制的动态系统可持续发展概念概念协调的动态理论游戏模型进行协调。在该概念中，管理控制和诱导方法的分层控制机制 - 与分层差异游戏的解决方案正式化，相对反映了为提供SD提供条件的受控动态系统的状态要求。行政控制涉及领先的球员（管理SD的主题）对追随者的可接受控制集（对受控动态系统的影响的主题）;和他的回报职能的激励。行政和经济管理机制正式被形式化为计算机模仿情景。文章中考虑的动态模型是开发yu.b提出的私人和社会利益的协调模型。 Germeyer和i.a. Vatel。进行了数值计算，实现了渔业模型这些控制机制的有效性的对比分析。

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