• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Managerial and decision economics: The international journal of research and progress in management economics >Adverse selection, limited compensation, and the design of environmental liability insurance contract in the case of enterprise bankruptcy
【24h】

Adverse selection, limited compensation, and the design of environmental liability insurance contract in the case of enterprise bankruptcy

机译：在企业破产的情况下，不利的选择，有限的赔偿和环境责任保险合同的设计

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In the case of incomplete environmental liability insurance, enterprises are likely to go bankrupt. Rational enterprises generally do not want to insure the environmental loss liability in case of bankruptcy even if they are compensated by insurance companies. This means that the premium calculated now is high, which may be the main reason for the current enterprises to cherish insurance. Based on this, a basic model of environmental liability insurance contract considering bankruptcy under ex ante asymmetric information is established. The model is improved by using the information screening combination tool, which further improves the efficiency of information screening.
机译：在不完全环境责任保险的情况下，企业可能会破产。 由于保险公司赔偿，理性企业通常不想为破产时不希望确保环境损失责任。 这意味着现在计算的保费很高，这可能是当前企业珍惜保险的主要原因。 基于这一点，建立了考虑在前赌注不对称信息下破产的环境责任保险合同的基本模型。 通过使用信息筛选组合工具改进了模型，这进一步提高了信息筛选的效率。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号